Struct VidShareAccumulator 

pub(crate) struct VidShareAccumulator<T: NodeType> {
    payload_commitment: VidCommitment2,
    metadata: <<T as NodeType>::BlockPayload as BlockPayload<T>>::Metadata,
    epoch: EpochNumber,
    expected_param: Option<AvidmGf2Param>,
    common: Option<AvidmGf2Common>,
    shares: BTreeMap<T::SignatureKey, AvidmGf2Share>,
    seen_keys: HashSet<T::SignatureKey>,
    exhausted: bool,
}

Fields

payload_commitment: VidCommitment2

The payload commitment claimed by the view’s validated proposal.

metadata: <<T as NodeType>::BlockPayload as BlockPayload<T>>::Metadata

epoch: EpochNumber

expected_param: Option<AvidmGf2Param>

The VID erasure parameters the committee fixes for this view, used to reject shares carrying a forged common.param (see Self::accept). None if the committee could not be resolved; the param check is then skipped, matching the previously unchecked path.

common: Option<AvidmGf2Common>

Common data pinned by the first admitted share; hash-bound to payload_commitment (see Self::accept).

shares: BTreeMap<T::SignatureKey, AvidmGf2Share>

Admitted shares by voter; their shard ranges are pairwise disjoint (see Self::accept).

seen_keys: HashSet<T::SignatureKey>

Every voter whose share was admitted, including weeded ones: a voter whose share failed verification doesn’t get a second submission.

exhausted: bool

Set when a fully verified share set failed to decode to a payload matching the commitment: the disperser is provably faulty and further attempts are pointless.

Implementations

impl<T: NodeType> VidShareAccumulator<T>

fn new( payload_commitment: VidCommitment2, metadata: <<T as NodeType>::BlockPayload as BlockPayload<T>>::Metadata, epoch: EpochNumber, expected_param: Option<AvidmGf2Param>, ) -> Self

fn accept( &mut self, view: ViewNumber, sender: T::SignatureKey, share: VidDisperseShare2<T>, )

Admit share from the authenticated sender, dropping it if it fails any intake check. The non-overlapping path stays crypto-free; a shard-range overlap is the only case that triggers per-share verification, via Self::resolve_conflict.

fn resolve_conflict( &mut self, view: ViewNumber, sender: T::SignatureKey, share: VidDisperseShare2<T>, conflicts: Vec<T::SignatureKey>, )

Resolve a shard-range collision between the incoming share and the already-admitted conflicts: verify each against the commitment-bound common, evict those that fail, and admit the newcomer only if it verifies and no surviving share still covers its range.

fn ranges(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &Range<usize>>

fn coverage(&self) -> usize

Number of shard positions covered by the admitted shares; exact because their ranges are disjoint.

fn has_enough_shares(&self) -> bool